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The politics of expediency: pursuing selfish national interests

That really loud crash you heard last week -- and no, I don't mean the Wall Street "correction" that caused the Dow Jones to plummet 500+ points -- was the collapse of yet another pillar of India's naïve foreign policy edifice. I mean the nonsense over the Non Aligned Movement. For all practical purposes, it is dead as far as India is concerned: President Mandela administered the coup de grace, or is it the mercy killing?

The NAM became a de facto oxymoron as soon as the Soviet Union collapsed -- if there was nobody to not-align with, then what does non-alignment mean? Clearly, nobody would like to now call it the Anti-American Movement, even though in the US state department's simplistic, black-and-white world, non-alignment has always meant anti-Americanism.

But the NAM lost its relevance much earlier. Admittedly, it may have made some sense at some point in the past, when there seemed to be a role for a Third Way, somewhere between laissez-faire capitalism and dirigiste communism. But NAM's day in the sun ended long ago; just take a look at the founders and their nations.

Tito's Yugoslavia has ceased to exist; Nasser's Egypt is in effect an American ally; Sukarno's Indonesia oppressed its communists brutally in the 60s, and is now suffering from the ills of unfettered capitalism; and Nehru's India is busy repudiating pretty much everything he stood for. The irrelevance of the NAM in today's world is quite striking -- it has been abandoned by its most ardent adherents.

India has deluded herself into thinking that the NAM, and individual members thereof, are her permanent friends. Not quite, as the pithy aphorism goes: there are only permanent interests, no permanent allies. India's foreign policy needs to be flexible enough to deal with changing circumstances.

For instance, despite many indications that it makes sense for India to improve her relationship with Israel, it took many years for India to even establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. Israel, of course, has carte blanche from America to do pretty much anything -- thus their pre-emptive strike on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear reactor many years ago was justified immediately, and later in hindsight, as the right thing to do.

It is believed that Israel offered, similarly, to collaborate with India to perform a surgical strike on Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear reactor/ weapons complex in the early 80s. If India had collaborated with Israel then, it would have been rationalised and explained away by the Americans. And of course, it would likely have resulted in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program being nipped in the bud. No A Q Khan Research Labs, no tit-for-tat nuclear bomb, no stockpile.

At the time, India viewed Israel as a neo-colonialist state trampling on the human rights of Palestinians. There is some merit to this perspective. However, it is also true that Israel suffers from terrorism, which may or may not be state-sponsored. Given India's (correct) stand that she is one of the worst-hit nations by cross-border, state-sponsored terrorism, isn't it clear there are some common Indo-Israeli interests?

Similarly, Iran and India share some common interests: for instance, countering Sunni extremists sponsored by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Taliban. As I write this, there are reports of massive troop movements on the Iran-Afghanistan border. Iran is also interested in the mineral wealth of the Central Asian ex-Soviet republics: India is a potential customer for this oil and natural gas.

Iran also needs India's support, given the general American animosity towards it. Iran, in return, can offer India its support in the community of Muslim nations, such as the Organisation of Islamic Countries. Thus there is mutual benefit to both parties -- and that should be the watchword of foreign policy relationships.

South Africa too is merely responding to a changing world; hence President Mandela's actions. First of all, the old man is nearing the end of his term, and with him, the first generation of idealistic freedom-fighters in South Africa are walking off into the sunset. A new generation is taking over, personified by hard-nosed Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's president-to-be.

It is believed that the assertiveness -- regarding Jammu and Kashmir and nuclear weapons -- was based on Mbeki's perspective. If I were to put myself into Mbeki's shoes, why on earth wouldn't I wish to ally myself with the Americans? After all, apartheid is a thing of the past. Thank you very much, India, for opposing apartheid tooth and nail, it was most decent of you, but let's move on and figure out how we can attract American foreign direct investment.

Furthermore, South Africa has no real enemies nearby that it needs to protect itself from using nuclear weapons, which of course is why the nation felt comfortable in unilaterally forswearing them -- the apartheid regime worried about its black neighbours ganging up on it, but today there is no such fear. So from South Africa's point of view a nuclear-free Indian Ocean region is quite desirable.

I also believe there's a little bit of Southern African political grandstanding in Mbeki's presumed thought process. South Africa and neighbouring Namibia are on a collision course as regards Congo and the embattled Laurent Kabila. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, looking for Namibian President Sam Nujoma's support at the NAM summit, was forced to imply Indian support for Kabila -- undoubtedly the pound of flesh Nujoma wanted. No doubt this irritated Mbeki.

But it is definite folly to expect gratitude from other nations. Consider two whose causes India has championed for decades: Bangladesh and Lebanon. After the immense sacrifices made by India to help Bangladesh free itself from tyranny, Indians might have expected them to be eternally grateful to India. As is well known, this is far from the case.

Similarly, while Lebanon was occupied by Syrian and Israeli forces, and it was going through a brutal civil war, India consistently spoke up on Lebanon's behalf. But I noticed with chagrin that a few years ago, when there was a scare about the plague in Surat, little Lebanon was the very first country to ban all flights and cargo shipments from India, with no particular evidence that there was great risk. It was a galling act.

All this points out to a flawed foreign policy model -- India should not think of herself as the leader of some rag-tag, diverse group of Third World nations. Instead she should consider herself an incipient superpower. Superpowers don't sponsor others' causes unless they are client or vassal states. Therefore, India should cease to worry about what NAM thinks -- frankly, they don't matter. India should actively consider which states can become her vassals.

Sentimentality has no place in the dog-eat-dog world of international politics. After all, most NAM nations did not think it fit to support India even for a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. Correctly figuring out where their bread was buttered, they instead voted Japan in. So why exactly should India care about the NAM's opinions? Friends in need they are not.

At the risk of sounding like Ayn Rand (whom I have never even read, but I understand she glorifies the pursuit of self-interest), I suggest that it is inappropriate to complain about the NAM's or South Africa's ingratitude. Indian policy-makers need to get themselves trained in the clear-eyed, ruthless discipline of Game Theory to forecast how other players will react.

Of course, India and Pakistan are to some extent involved in an extended Prisoner's Dilemma situation; indeed some of the ideas from successful strategies in this game could also be used in dealings with such intransigents as India's many baffling politicians. After all, every one of them is a rational economic player who understands self-interest and expediency.

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Rajeev Srinivasan