Commentary/Saisuresh Sivaswamy

Gujral's Flawed Doctrine

If a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, then the strength of an administration revolves around its major failing. But if the government were to be full only of weaknesses, then even its perceived strengths lose little time in becoming the heel of Achilles.

And that, is what seems to be happening to Inder Kumar Gujral’s foreign policy initiative. Just over six months ago, when he took over as prime minister, it was felt that given his background and interest, his domestic policy would be nothing to write home about, while his moves on the international diplomacy front would be so outstanding as to overshadow his, larger, closer-to-home failures.

Well, six months down the line, with the advantage of hindsight, the good news is that the fears -- of local disasters -- have come true. And the bad news is that the only hope -- of overseas victory -- was belied.

On the domestic front, there really could have been no other outcome given the various pressures on the government, thanks to the alliance of 13 parties that are presiding over the nation’s destiny. This did not extend to the foreign policy front, since most did not want anything to do with it thanks to it being as a specialised area, and the prime minister himself was not too sad about this non-interference. He more or less had a free run here, something which cannot be said about his government in other fields, which was why he put forward what has come to be known as the Gujral doctrine.

And its weakest point -- that it takes two to tango, whether on the floor or across borders -- was well and truly exposed by his counterpart from Islamabad. You can talk friendship and cross-cultural exchanges, even unilateral concessions, but all these will come to nought if the other side is not receptive to them. Diplomacy is not a one-sided affair, very often it is a many-sided one, and that is something that the prime minister, in his innate goodness, has overlooked.

So where does this leave the Gujral government, since it has failed even on the one front it was expected to deliver results? Luckily, while it may not strengthen the administration, nor does it leave it any weaker that it already is, and that is the only consolation that the prime minister and his friends can draw from the experience of dealing with Pakistan.

Peace with that country is very desirable, and its importance, impact on the trade and commerce between the two countries, not to mention the availability of funds for development purposes that closer ties will engender, cannot be overemphasised. After all, there is no reason why the two cannot be friends, when more intractable foes have joined hands. But peace too, exists in a certain matrix, a matrix that is not existent between the two countries, and unless efforts are made to bring into being that framework, peace cannot and will not devolve.

And just what is this matrix that is being spoken about? It’s very simple, and is more or less like what exists between two persons who are keen on becoming friends. First of all, of course, there has to be a bilateral desire to extend hands, it cannot be one-sided. One assumes that in this case the two sides are equally keen on becoming friends, at least that was the original impression that went around from the two prime ministers.

Second, while friendship means give and take, it also cannot either give or take something that is critical to one’s existence. Like you cannot ask someone to abjure his spouse for the sake of friendship, or some such thing. India in the present instance, tried to make a beginning of sorts by opening up the visa regime to Pakistani travelers, expecting something in return. The peace initiative fell apart when for this give, Islamabad tried to take away Kashmir.

Given the situation on the ground, I think the two sides ought to have tried practicing give and take later, when the other ground rules were more established.

What the two could have done was to scale down their military presence on the border simultaneously, and to have their missiles turn away from the targets on either side. A non-aggression pact is often discussed, but that is also something way off; before that, confidence building needs to be done, otherwise it becomes a case of putting the plane before the propeller.

Before turning to major issues, the smaller ones, like freeing restrictions on people-to-people contact, encouraging free exchange of ideas, and calling off propaganda needs to be done. There is every reason to believe that the foreign secretary-level talks which were resumed under Gujral went into all this, but of course they couldn’t clear the landmine that is Kashmir.

Obviously, there is plenty to gain from peace from both sides, and both the prime ministers are savvy enough to understand it. If the stumbling block was set up by Pakistan, then there is good reason to believe that the civilian government, which only recently proclaimed its independence of the stranglehold of the military junta, has reverted to the earlier situation in which it took orders from the army HQ.

For that is the only institution that stands to gain from the continuation of hostilities, mistrust and rancour on both the sides. As these negative feelings fuel jingoism -- witness the stoning of Indian cricketers in Karachi at a time when Pakistan wee doing well -- it also justifies the defence forces’s claim for more funds to stock up their arms and armaments, just in case the Big Bully chose to walk in.

And that, even while feeding the fears of a population under siege, also contains the flaw in the argument. Only a madman can argue that India, which is unable to handle its own affairs and which so very often reaches flashpoint in its rollercoaster existence, would want to add more headache by annexing another people.

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